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Abstract
This note considers a bargaining environment with two-sided asymmetric
information and quasilinear preferences in which parties select bargaining mech-
anism after learning their valuations. I demonstrate that sometimes the buyer
achieves a higher ex-ante payoff if the bargaining mechanism is selected by her
opponent rather than by herself. In the model, the buyer has limited wealth
and in addition to acquiring one good from the seller can purchase a different
good from a competitive market. The positive relation between the values of
these goods is what delivers our result.
JEL Codes: C72, C78, D82.
This note presents a simple bargaining model with two-sided asymmetric informa-
tion and quasilinear preferences, in which the buyer selects a bargaining mechanism
after learning her valuation.1 I demonstrate that there exist circumstances such that
the buyer achieves a higher ex-ante payoff if the mechanism is selected by her oppo-
nent rather than by herself.
In my model, in addition to acquiring one good from the seller, the buyer can also
acquire some other good, whose value is positively related to the (relative) value of
the first good. Because the buyer has limited wealth and uses the monetary rents
remaining after bargaining with the seller to purchase the other good, her ex-ante
payoff is maximized in a mechanism that generates relatively high monetary rents for
the types with high valuations and zero payoffs for the types with low valuations.
However, if the buyer selects a mechanism after learning her valuation, the types
with low valuations can always achieve some positive payoff by offering an ultimatum
bargaining game; this makes impossible for the buyer to implement an ex-ante optimal
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1That is, the buyer is an informed principal. Myerson [10] and Maskin and Tirole [8] and [9] are
the main references in this field.
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mechanism. Results in Yilankaya [18] imply that in this environment all types of
the buyer will always implement an allocation that is equivalent to the equilibrium
allocation of the ultimatum bargaining game conditional on their type.2 (A symmetric
result holds if the seller selects a mechanism.)
Now imagine that instead of the buyer, the mechanism is chosen by the seller.
The seller will select an ultimatum bargaining game, in which she makes a take-
it-or-leave-it price offer. The seller will extract almost all valuation from medium
valuation types, exclude from trade low valuation types, and leave some rent to the
high valuation types of the buyer. Importantly, the expected rents for the high types
of the buyer could be quite large resulting in a bigger ex-ante payoff in this game
than in the ultimatum game in which the buyer makes an offer herself.
The fact that because of the conflict of preferences among different types of a
player, the allocation implemented by her types does not maximize her ex-ante payoff
is not specific to my model. (Mylovanov [13] demonstrates that for generic prior beliefs
and concave payoffs a player who is privately informed will fail to implement ex-ante
optimal allocation.) This note shows that this conflict could be so destructive that
the implemented allocation is ex-ante inferior to the allocation that maximizes the
(ex-ante and interim) payoff of the opponent and ignores the payoff of the player.3
Environment. There is a buyer who can purchase two goods A and B. Good A
can only be acquired from a seller, who has one unit of this good. The seller’s cost
c of good A is her private information. Good B can be acquired from a competitive
market with unlimited supply at the unit price normalized to one. The buyer’s has
total wealth of W > 1 (With unlimited wealth, the buyer in my model would acquire
infinite amount of good B).
The marginal values of the goods A and B for the buyer are correspondingly vA
and vB.
4 In order to make purchase of good B always desirable, it is assumed that
vB ≥ 1. Let v = vA/vB be the relative value of good A. I assume that v uniquely
determines values vA and vB and, in particular, that vB = g(v), where g(·) is a weakly
increasing function. This relative value v is (one-dimensional) private information of
the buyer. The seller’s and the buyer’s private information (types), c and v, are
distributed according to Fc(·) and Fv(·) with continuous differentiable bounded and
everywhere strictly positive densities fc(·) and fv(·) and support on [0, 1].
Let x be the exchanged amount of good A and p be the price paid by the buyer
to the seller. Then, the payoff of the seller is us(c, x, p) = p − xc and the payoff of
the buyer is ub(v, x, p) = xvA + vB(W − p) = vB(x vAvB +W − p) = g(v)(xv +W − p).
Notice that the buyer’s interim preferences can be represented by a function which
2In this note, equivalence is meant in terms of the parties’ expected payoffs conditional on their
private information. Yilankaya [18] has proven the result that the informed seller will implement an
allocation equivalent to the equilibrium allocation of the ultimatum bargaining game. It is immediate
to modify his arguments to establish the result for the buyer.
3Unlike the buyer, the seller in my model would implement the same allocation regardless of
whether she selects a mechanism ex-ante or after learning her type.
4An alternative interpretation is to think of goods A and B as intermediate goods in production
of a final good Y whose value is 1 and whose production technology is given by Y = vAxA + vBxB ,
where xA, xB , and Y are the corresponding amounts of the goods.
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measures the monetary surplus from trade in good A, u˜b(v, x, p) = xv − p.5 Hence,
after the parties’ private information has been realized, this environment becomes
equivalent to the bargaining setting with two-sided incomplete information in Myerson
and Satterthwaite [11].
Bargaining. When the buyer selects a mechanism, the timing of the game is as
follows: First, the parties simultaneously and privately observe their own types. Then,
the buyer offers a mechanism. If the seller accepts, the mechanism is played and the
buyer pays the price and obtains the amount of good A prescribed by the mechanism.
After that, the buyer acquires good B from the market.6 The game ends. When the
seller selects a mechanism, the roles are reversed: the seller makes a mechanism offer
and the buyer decides whether to accept it. The rest of the game is the same as
before. The solution concept for these games is Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.7
Mechanism selection. Because at the moment of mechanism selection, the prefer-
ences of the players can be described by us(c, x, p) = p− xc and u˜b(v, x, p) = xv − p,
the results in Yilankaya [18] are valid for my setting. Yilankaya shows that the seller
who has private information about her valuation at the moment of selecting a mech-
anism will implement an allocation equivalent to the allocation resulting from the
ultimatum bargaining game.8 Similar results are straightforward to obtain for the
buyer.
Result. Notice that the ex-ante payoff of the buyer can be written as
∫ 1
0
g(v)(U˜(v)+
W )fv(v)dv, where U˜(v) = Eu˜b(v, x, p). Let us denote by U˜S(v) and U˜B(v) the buyer’s
expected payoff conditional on her type in the mechanism selected by the seller and
the mechanism selected by the buyer correspondingly. If g(v) is relatively high for
large v and for the high types of the buyer U˜S(v) > U˜B(v), the buyer’s ex-ante payoff
is higher in the game where she receives an ultimatum offer:
Proposition 1. If there is some v′ < 1 such that U˜S(v) > U˜B(v) for all v > v′, then
there exists g(·) for which the ex-ante expected payoff of the buyer is strictly higher if
the mechanism is selected by her opponent rather than by herself.
Proof. The difference between the ex-ante expected payoffs in the game where the
5After the private information of the buyer is realized, she treats g(v) as a constant. Then, one
can divide ub(v, x, p) by g(v) and subtract W to obtain u˜b(v, x, p).
6In the model, there are three endogenously determined variables: the payment for good A and
the amounts of goods A and B acquired by the buyer. It is assumed that the parties can contract
only on the first two.
7For a precise description of mechanism selection game, including the set of allowed mechanisms
and details of the solution concept see Maskin and Tirole [9] and Mylovanov [12].
8Yilankaya invokes the characterization of an ex-ante optimal allocation in Williams [17], which
requires additional assumptions on distribution functions, e.g., monotonicity of the hazard rate of the
buyer’s distribution. Proposition 2 in Mylovanov [12] extends Yilankaya’s result to non-monotonic
case.
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seller sets the price and the buyer sets the price is
∆ =
∫ 1
0
g(v)
(
U˜S(v)− U˜B(v)
)
fv(v)dv =∫ v′
0
g(v)
(
U˜S(v)− U˜B(v)
)
fv(v)dv+∫ 1
v′
g(v)
(
U˜S(v)− U˜B(v)
)
fv(v)dv.
It is immediate that there exist g(·) increasing on [v′, 1] such that the second term
in the above expression is large enough to ensure ∆ > 0.
Example. Let Fc(c) = c and Fv(v) = 1−(1−v)4. Then, it is direct to demonstrate
that there exists v′ ≈ 0.544 such that U˜S(v) ≥ U˜B(v) if v ≥ v′ and U˜S(v) < U˜B(v)
otherwise. If g(v) = 1 + 3v, the buyer’s ex-ante payoff is higher in the game where
her opponent selects the mechanism.
First-mover disadvantage. The result in Proposition 1 can be equivalently stated
as that the buyer may have first-mover disadvantage in the ultimatum bargaining
game: she obtains a higher ex-ante payoff in the game in which she moves second
receiving an ultimatum price offer than in the game in which she moves first making
such an offer herself.9 This is in accordance with some of the business bargaining
literature which recommends to wait for an offer rather than to make one.10
Li and Tan [6] make a similar observation in the context of a choice between hidden
and announced reserve price in auctions with risk-averse bidders and continuous types.
In one-bidder environment announcing the reservation price is equivalent to making
a take-it-or-leave-it price offer, whereas hiding the reservation price is equivalent to
receiving such an offer. Li and Tan show that a sufficiently risk-averse bidder will
make offers which are very close to her true valuation and therefore receiving an
offer generates a higher ex-ante payoff for the seller than making an offer. My model
differs in two important respects. First, it is currently not known which mechanism
will be selected by the informed seller in the environment in Li and Tan. However, the
results in Quesada [15] suggest that the seller will offer a mechanism that is different
from and achieves a higher expected payoff than in the ultimatum bargaining game.11
Furthermore, in my model there is no risk-aversion.
9First-mover disadvantage is often present in Bertrand duopoly games due to ability to undercut
the first mover and in Cournot duopoly games with incomplete information due to the distortion in
the equilibrium action caused by signalling effects (Dowrick [3], Gal-Or [4], Amir and Stepanova [1],
Mailath [7], Normann [14]). In the models of research and development and adoption of new tech-
nology, a second-mover advantage may appear because of informational spillovers or technological
advances Reinganum [16] and Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube [5].
10See, for instance “The Sourcing Solution: A Step-By-Step Guide to Creating a Successful Pur-
chasing Program,” by Larry Paquette, p. 147, “Flipping Properties: Generate Instant Cash Profits
in Real Estate,” by William Bronchick and Robert Dahlstrom, p. 66, “On-Scene Guide for Crisis
Negotiators,” by Frederick J. Lanceley, p. 90, “Energy Economics and International Energy Mar-
kets,” by Carol A Dahl, p. 245, “From the Complete Idiot’s Guy to Getting Along with Difficult
People,” by Brandon Toropov, p. 191.
11Quesada considers a setting with discrete types and one risk-averse agent. It is simple to show
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Finally, Cornet [2] presents a bargaining model in which there is a seller and two
buyers, who can resell the good to each other. The possibility of resale increases
competition among the buyers and may lead to a higher ex-ante payoff for the seller
in the game where she receives the buyers’ offers than in the game where she makes
an offer herself.
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